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ABSTRACT The Internet of Things (IoT) is developing towards smart and mobile Internet of Things
(SM-IoT), which has made great progress. Due to the inherent heterogeneity, distribution, intensive communication, and resource constraints of SM-IoT, efficient security and privacy communication protocols become
a particularly critical challenge. Signcryption has received considerable attention. Various signcryption
schemes have been proposed to solve secure communication. However, most of them are low in efficiency,
without the consideration of characteristics of the SM-IoT. In this paper, we propose a signcryption scheme
to achieve efficient secure multi-message and multi-receiver communication for the heterogeneous and
distributed SM-IoT. We develop Identity-based Cryptography (IBC) and Certificateless Cryptography (CLC)
to solve the certificate management problem. Our scheme no longer needs wireless secure channel during
key generation phase of traditional CLC system, which improves the applicability of our scheme in wireless
SM-IoT environment. There is no expensive operations, such as bilinear pairing, in our scheme. In addition,
our scheme outsources part of the verification overhead from the SM-IoT users to the gateway without
revealing user privacy. The performance evaluation shows that the computation efficiency in both sender
and receiver side is improved in our scheme.
INDEX TERMS Certificateless cryptography (CLC), identity-based cryptography (IBC), heterogeneous,
verification outsourcing, smart mobile Internet of Things (SM-IoT), multi-massage and multi-receiver
signcryption.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Internet of Things (IoT) is emerging as an important part
of the new generation of information technology [1]. The IoT
aims to create an open global network connecting people,
things and data, providing a ubiquitous interconnected mobile
and smart sensor network for smart cities [2]. Security and
privacy are always the crucial issues of IoT.
In order to protect the security and privacy of the IoT environment, extensive research on physical layer security [3],
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Zheli Liu.
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authentication (such as RFID authentication [4]–[6]), secure
access control mechanism (e.g., access control scheme based
on attribute base encryption [7]), secure communication, network traffic and data analysis method [8]–[10], and threat
detection technology [11], [12] has been carried out.
The IoT architecture consists of four layers: sensing layer,
interconnection layer, data layer and service layer [13]. The
purpose of the service layer or the application layer is to
provide various typical/personalized services or customized
recommendations for users. IoT is developing towards the
Smart and Mobile Internet of Things (SM-IoT) [14], and has
made great progress. For example, smart traffic management
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systems enable cities aims to control traffic facilities and
improve the efficiency. Smart medical systems can collect
patients’ data and help medical professionals to monitor
the physical condition of patients in real time. At present,
the demand for services based on SM-IoT is increasing
and tending to diversify, such as medical services, weather
forecasting, various resource management, environmental
awareness and data acquisition. Because of the flattening
of services, each authentication entity in SM-IoT can be a
service sender. It makes the information and decentralized
communication technology system face more and more network security threats [12], since many services are related to
users’ sensitive information and private data.
In addition, it is noticeable that the number of IoT devices
is growing dramatically. Cisco predicted that, by 2025,
500 billions devices will connect the Internet [15]. The
SM-IoT allows them to interact with each other [16].
It indicates that there will be more intensive communication between people and things, things and things. The IoT
system is usually deployed in a distributed environment.
In a distributed environment, IoT entities exchange information dynamically to provide a decentralized and scalable
infrastructure, to support billions of devices generating and
exchanging large amount of data. Decentralized communication has become a crucial trend of SM-IoT, such as
the researches on block-chain based mechanism [17] and
device-to-device (D2D) communication technology. Meanwhile, we need more efficient secure schemes and mechanisms that can fulfill the heterogeneity and distribution of the
SM-IoT environment. Among numerous cryptography methods, signcryption, a cryptography primitive can be applied to
decentralized communication environment, has received considerable attention because of its high efficiency and security.
Various efficient signcryption schemes have been proposed to
achieve secure decentralized communication.
In this article, we consider the requirements to provide efficient personalized services for SM-IoT users, while ensuring
security and privacy.
General multi-cast mechanism can only provide typical
services through centralized approach, but can not provide
personalized services for each user. Lacking of encryption
and authentication mechanism makes SM-IoT devices more
vulnerable to malicious attacks and threats. Multi-message
and multi-receiver signcryption is an effective method to
solve the problem. Multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption can complete the encryption and signature process
of different messages sent to different receivers in one logical step. Receivers get customized messages that belongs
to themselves, while other receivers can not decrypt them.
It ensures both data privacy and communication security.
At the same time, this method does not increase the cost of
the SM-IoT receiver.
The challenging issues motivate us to design a scheme to
complete secure communications from service sender of IBC
system to the receivers of CLC system, which meets the needs
of personalized multi-cast in the SM-IoT.
180206

TABLE 1. Notations.

In this paper, we propose a multi-message and multireceiver signcryption scheme for SM-IoT system, which can
provide data privacy and communication security with higher
efficiency. Our contributions can be summarized as follow:
1) We propose an efficient multi-message and multireceiver signcryption scheme, which is constructed
based on ECC, employing scalar point multiplication
operations rather than bilinear pairing. The calculation
complexity of the scheme is relatively lower.
2) Our scheme is a heterogeneous communication scheme
from the sender of IBC to receivers of CLC. It explores
the PKG and the KGC to generate keys for users of IBC
and CLC systems respectively. It is more practical in
SM-IoT applications.
3) In order to reduce the SM-IoT receivers’ computing
overhead, we outsource part of the receivers’ verification computation operations to the gateway, and verify the computation. Meanwhile, the gateway can not
access the privacy information of the SM-IoT receivers.
4) Our scheme hides the partial private key for wireless
network users of CLC system during the key generation
process. A secure channel is no longer needed between
the SM-IoT user and the KGC, which increases the
security of the scheme.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews
the related works. The security assumptions, network
model, system model, and security model are described at
Section 3 in detail, while Section 4 presents the proposed
scheme. Correctness proof and security analysis of the proposed scheme are demonstrated in section 5. In section 6,
we compare the function and performance between the proposed scheme and previous ones, and simulate the execution
time of several schemes. A summary of this paper is made in
Section 7.
In order to make the article easier to understand, TABLE 1
displays the abbreviations and notations used in this paper.
II. RELATED WORKS

In 1997, Zheng [18] fitst proposed the primitive of signcryption, which can complete signature and encryption in one
VOLUME 7, 2019
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single logical step. Initially, the schemes proposed by the
researchers were based on public key infrastructure (PKI),
e.g., schemes [19], [20]. But PKI has the burden of certificate management, which requires both storage and time.
Considering the certificate management burden, as early as
1984, Shamir [21] introduced the concept of identity-based
cryptography (IBC) to solve this problem. In IBC system,
the user’s public key is calculated based on his/her identity
information. Thus, IBC gets rid of the burden of certificate
management.
In 2002, Malone-Lee [22] combined IBC and signcryption,
and proposed identity-based signcryption (IBSC) scheme.
Libert and Quisquater [23] proposed three IBSC schemes
after pointing out the insecurity of Malone-Lee’s scheme.
In 2003, Chow et al. [24] proposed a IBSC scheme which can
provide both public verifiability and forward security. And
Boyen [25] proposed a IBSC scheme with public verifiability,
forward security, and anonymity. Li and Khan [26] made a
survey, and summarized the future research trend of IBSC,
including designing and constructing new and efficient IBSC
schemes with special properties in the standard model, constructing postquantum signcryption, and finding new applications for IBSC. IBSC has great advantage in computation
and communication overhead, researchers have applied it to
the Internet of Things. In 2017, Karati et al. [27] presented
an IBSC scheme for Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)
environment. However, the IBSC has the problem of excessive dependence on PKG, which is inherent in identity-based
encryption system, because it needs the PKG to generate the
user’s full private key. Once the PKG is attacked, the system
security will be greatly effected or even be destroyed.
In 2003, Al-Riyami and Peterson [28] proposed the concept of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC),
which changes the way the user’s public and private keys
were generated. The user generates a secret value, and combines it with the partial private key generated by the KGC to
obtain full private key. Therefore, the key escrow problem is
addressed by CL-PKC. In 2008, Barbosa and Farshim [29]
researched the Certificateless Signcryption System (CLSC)
and proposed the first certificateless signcryption scheme.
However, their scheme requires six pairing operations during signcrypt and designcrypt phase which is low in efficiency. Wu and Chen [30] proposed a new CLSC scheme
which needs four pairing operations, and Sharmila et al. [31]
analyzed that their scheme was insecure. Then, in 2010,
Liu et al. [32] proposed a novel scheme which is secure
in the standard model, but their scheme needs five pairing operations. Xie and Zhang [33] proposed a new certificateless scheme which only needs two pairings. Thus,
their scheme is more efficient than other CLSC schemes
proposed before. However, all of these schemes employed
bilinear pairing operations, whose efficiency is much lower
than that of scalar multiplication over the elliptic curve group.
In 2009, Sharmila et al. [34] proposed the first CLSC scheme
without bilinear pairing and prove it in the random oracle
model. Henceforth, Certificateless signcryption tends to be
VOLUME 7, 2019

more lightweight. In 2010, Xie and Zhang [35] proposed
a pairing-free CLSC scheme, which is more efficient than
all previous constructions. Since then, many CLSC schemes
without bilinear pairing have been proposed (e.g., [36]–[38]).
Researchers put forward many CLSC schemes combined
with the different mechanisms and other technologies,
which are suitable for various environments. In 2017,
Li et al. [39] proposed a certificateless signcryption scheme
which achieves the public verifiability, ciphertext authenticity
as well as insider security. And they designed an access
control scheme based on the proposed certificateless signcryption scheme. References [38] and [40] combine the characteristics of the IoT environment, improve the efficiency of
CLSC signcryption, and make it suitable for the application
of IoT safely and effectively.
Furthermore, the schemes above are constructed for oneto-one communication, which is unable to meet the growing
demand for multicast communication. There are schemes
provide the sender with the function that send one message to different receivers. In 2006, the first multi-receiver
signcryption scheme based on IBC was proposed by Duan
and Cao [41]. Schemes [42], [43] are constructed based
on identity-based signcryption, which ensure the anonymity
of receivers. Hung et al. [44], Islam et al. [45], and
Pang et al. [46] proposed multi-receiver certificateless signcryption schemes respectively.
In the SM-IoT environment we consider, there are demands
of sending personalized services and customized messages,
which means we need to send different messages to different
receivers at a time. The SM-IoT has raised the requirement
for secure multi-message and multi-receiver communication
services. The concept of multi-receiver and multi-message
signcryption was first proposed by Seo and Kim [47] in 1999.
They construct a multi-message and multi-receiver domain
authentication signcryption scheme. Users in the authentication domain can verify the validity of the message and
decrypt it to get their own. Elkamchouchi and Hagras [48]
proposed a multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption
scheme based on ECC which reduced the computational
overhead. Kumar and Ansari [49] proposed a scheme which
supports public verifiability in 2013. But it is regretful that
their scheme uses time-consuming modular exponentiation
operations. And in 2019, Pang et al. [50] constructed a
certificateless signcryption scheme based on ECC, which is
efficient and ensures the anonymity of receivers. However,
because of the complexity of communication environment,
different communication terminals may be in different security cryptography environment, which means that we need
to consider signcryption schemes for heterogeneous systems.
This situation is more common in the SM-IoT environment.
In order to adapt to the heterogeneity of the SM-IoT, heterogeneous signcryption schemes have received great attention.
In 2010, Sun and Li [51] proposed the multi-receiver signcryption scheme for secure communication between IBC and
PKI. Huang et al. [52] proposed a heterogeneous scheme that
allows the sender in the IBC system to send a message to the
180207
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FIGURE 1. Network model.

receiver in the PKI system, and scheme [53] was constructed
based on CLC and PKI. Obviously, these schemes generally have the problem of certificate management overhead,
because they are constructed based on PKI. Li et al. [54]
and Niu et al. [55] proposed a multi-receiver signcryption
scheme between IBC and CLC respectively, but their schemes
employ bilinear pairing operation, which makes their scheme
low inefficient.
III. PRELIMINARIES

In this section, we briefly review the definition of security
assumption, and then give the network model, general model
and security model of the scheme.
A. SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS

Assuming p is a large integer prime, and G is an addition
cyclic group of points on ECC with order p, P is a generator of
G, Zp∗ is a nonzero multiplicative group based on p. We define
the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) and
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) as follow:
1) ECDLP

Given two elements P, Q ∈ G, and Q = aP, where a ∈ Zp∗ ,
computing a is called ECDLP.
Definition 1: The probability advantage of extracting
ECDLP by any probability polynomial time (PPT) adversary
A defined as follow is negligible.
AdvECDLP
(k) = Pr[A(P, aP) = a|a ∈ Zp∗ ]
A

180208

(1)

2) CDHP

Given tuple (P, aP, bP), where a, b ∈ Zp∗ , computing abP is
called CDHP.
Definition 2: The probability advantage of extracting
CDHP by any PPT adversary A defined as follow is
negligible.
AdvCDHP
(k) = Pr[A(P, aP, bP) = abP|a, b ∈ Zp∗ ].
A

(2)

B. NETWORK MODEL

As shown in Fig. 1, our network model contains four entities,
the Trusted Service Provider, including the KGC for CLC
and the PKG for IBC, Resource Senders of IBC system,
receivers of CLC system and the gateway. We assume the
PKG and KGC are fully trusted, and the gateway is honest
but curious, which means that the gateway honestly follows the scheme, but is curious to decrypt the ciphertext.
The sender needs to be authorized by the PKG. The PKG
generates a private key for the sender of the IBC system,
and the KGC generates partial private keys for receivers
of the CLC system. Then, the sender signcrypts messages
and transmits the signcryption ciphertext to the gateway.
The gateway computes the signcryption verification parameter, and transfers it with ciphertext to receivers. Only the
designated receivers can correctly verify the parameter and
signature, and then decrypt the corresponding signcryption
ciphertext. This model supplies an efficient and secure oneto-many decentralized communication for heterogeneous
SM-IoT.

VOLUME 7, 2019
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C. GENERAL MODEL

The general model of our scheme is composed of four main
algorithms [39], [55], Setup Algorithm, Key Extraction Algorithm, Signcryption Algorithm, Designcryption Algorithm,
described as follow.
1) SETUP ALGORITHM

With security parameter λ as input, the PKG runs the PKG
setup algorithm and KGC runs the KGC setup algorithm
to generate their master keys and system public keys, and
keep master key secret respectively. Then, the Trusted Service
Provider publishes the public parameter param.
2) KEY EXTRACTION ALGORITHM

This algorithm is divided into Identity-Based Cryptography Key Generation(IBC-KG) algorithm and Certificateless Cryptography Key Generation(CLC-KG) algorithm as
follow:
IBC-KG. This algorithm runs by PKG of the IBC system.
The sender sends his identity IDs to the PKG. The PKG
generates corresponding private key SKs for the sender and
returns back through secure channel.
CLC-KG. The algorithm runs by KGC and users of the
CLC system.
1) Set Secret Value Algorithm: The receiver of CLC system runs this algorithm to generate a secret value xi ,
which is used to construct his full private key and the
corresponding public key parameter Xi .
2) Extract Partial Private Key Algorithm: The algorithm
runs by the KGC of CLC system. With IDi and Xi
as inputs, the KGC generates corresponding partial
private key di hiding in ui , and public key parameter
Ti , then transmits (ui , Ti ) through public channel.
3) Set Public Key Algorithm: The algorithm runs by the
receiver. With Ti and public key parameter Xi as inputs,
user generates his public key PKi . Then, the user sends
PKi to the KGC for publication.
4) Set Full Private Key Algorithm: The algorithm runs
by the receiver. After obtaining partial private key di
from ui , with secret value xi as input, the user generates
his/her full private key SKi .
3) SIGNCRYPTION ALGORITHM

This algorithm runs by the sender of IBC system. Taken
sender’s private key SKs and system public parameter param,
a set of receivers’ PKi and the messages M = {mi |i =
1, 2, . . . , n} as inputs, the algorithm returns the full signcryption ciphertext σ .
4) DESIGNCRYPTION ALGORITHM

With ciphertext σ , the gateway computes the signcryption
verification parameter and transmits to receivers. With the
public key of sender and the private key of receiver SKi
as inputs, the receiver verifies the parameter, and then runs
VOLUME 7, 2019

Designcryption algorithm to verify and recover his plaintext
message mi .
D. SECURITY MODELS

This subsection defines the security model [46], [56], [57] of
the proposed scheme under random oracal. The confidentiality of the proposed scheme is defined based on the concept of
indistinguishable against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks
(IND-CCA2), considering two types of adversary. A Type I
adversary AI is a dishonest user, who can not know the master
key of KGC but has the right to replace any user’s public
key. A Type II adversary AII is a curious but honest KGC,
who knows the master key but does not have the authorize to
replace user’s public key. The authorization is defined based
on the concept of existential unforgeability against adaptive
chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA).
1) GAME 1: CONFIDENTIALITY WITH ADVERSARY AI

Game 1 is defined to meet IND-CCA2 against AI . The game
is an interaction between the challenger C and the adversary
AI under IND-CCA2. 5 is an IBC-CLC multi-message and
multi-receiver signcryption algorithm. The game is shown as
follows.
Setup: Given security parameter λ, challenger C runs
the Setup Algorithm, generates system public parameter
param, sends to adversary AI , but keeps KGC’s master key
s2 secret. And AI chooses a set of target identities I =
{IDi |i = 1, 2, . . . , n}.
Phase 1: A1 makes polynomial bounded number of queries
to C.
1) Partial private key query: AI chooses an IDj ∈
/ I and
sends to C. C runs the Extract Partial Private Key
Algorithm to generate corresponding partial private key
and then sends it back to AI .
2) Secret value query: AI sends IDj to the challenger C. C
runs the CLC-KG Algorithm to get secret value of user.
3) Public key query: AI queries for the public key of IDj ,
and C runs Set Public Key Algorithm and returns the
result to the adversary.
4) Replace public key: The adversary may replace the
public key of any user.
5) Signcryption query: With the public key sender IDs ,
receivers I ∗ = {IDj |j = 1, 2, . . . , n, j 6 = i}, the adversary AI queries for signcryption of message set M =
{m1 , m2 , . . . , mn }. The challenger C runs the Signcryption Algorithm to generate corresponding signcryption
ciphertext σ and returns it back to AI .
6) Designcryption query: The adversary AI submits a
signcryption ciphertext σ under sender IDs , receivers
I ∗ = {IDj |j = 1, 2, . . . , n, j 6 = i}. C runs the Designcryption Algorithm to compute the result and then sends
back to AI .
Challenge: AI chooses two plaintext M0 , M1 , and IDs ,
IDi ∈ I , AI is not allowed to query the partial private key
of IDi in Phase 1. Then, C selects β ∈ 0, 1, and runs the
180209
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Signcryption Algorithm and generates corresponding ciphertext σ ∗ to send back to AI .
Phase 2: AI can query as Phase 1, but can not query partial
private key of any receiver whose IDi ∈ I , or private key of
receivers whose public key has been replaced, and not query
for the designcryption of σ ∗.
Guess: AI produces a bit β 0 . If β 0 = β, then AI wins the
game. The advantage of AI is defined as follow:
2
AdvIND−CCA
(AI ) = Pr[β 0 = β] −
5

1
2

(3)

Definition 3: If the probability advantage of AI to win
2
Game 1 meets that AdvIND−CCA
(AI ) ≤ ε within PPT τ ,
5
where ε is the non-negligible advantage. Then we said algorithm 5 is IND-CCA2-I secure.
2) GAME 2: CONFIDENTIALITY WITH ADVERSARY AII

Game 2 is defined to meet IND-CCA2 against AII . The game
is an interaction between the challenger C and the adversary
AII under IND-CCA2. 5 is an IBC-CLC multi-message and
multi-receiver signcryption algorithm. The game is shown as
follows.
Setup: Given security parameter λ, challenger C setup as in
Game 1, but sends param, and master keys s1 , s2 to adversary
AII . The adversary AII chooses a set of target receivers I =
{IDi |i = 1, 2, . . . , n}.
Phase 1: The adversary AII can make polynomial bounded
number of queries as in Phase 1 of Game 1. The challenger
C makes corresponding responds.
Challenge: AII chooses two plaintext M0 , M1 , and IDs ,
IDi ∈ I , then submits to C. AII is not allowed to make
Secret Key query of IDi ∈ I in Phase 1. The challenger runs
Signcryption Algorithm to generate corresponding ciphertext
σ ∗ , and returns to AII .
Phase 2: AII performs the queries as in Phase 1, except
Secret value query of IDi ∈ I , private key query of receivers
whose public key has been replaced, and Designcryption
query of σ ∗ .
Guess: The adversary AII produces a bit β 0 . If β 0 = β, AII
wins the game. And the advantage of AII is defined as follow:
2
AdvIND−CCA
(AII ) = Pr[β 0 = β] −
5

1
2

(4)

Definition 4: If the probability advantage of AII to win Game
2
2 meets that AdvIND−CCA
(AII ) ≤ ε within PPT τ , where ε is
5
the non-negligible advantage. Then we say the algorithm 5
is IND-CCA2-II secure.
3) GAME 3: UNFORGEABILITY

Game 3 is defined to meet EUF-CMA against the forger F.
The game is an interaction between the challenger C and the
forger F under EUF-CMA. 5 is a IBC-CLC multi-message
and multi-receiver signcryption algorithm. The game is
shown as follows.
Setup: Given security parameter λ, challenger C runs the
Setup Algorithm to generate public parameter param, and
180210

master keys. Then sends the param to the forger F, and keeps
master key of PKG secret. F chooses a target identity ID0s .
Attack: F makes polynomial queries as follows.
1) Private key query: F submits an IDs 6 = ID0s to challenger C. C runs the IBC_KG Algorithm to generate
corresponding private key of IDs and returns it back
to F.
2) Signcryption query: F submits IDs , IDi (i = 1, 2,
. . . , n), and message M . C runs the Signcryption Algorithm to generate corresponding ciphertext σ and return
it back to F.
Forgery: F produces a σ 0 with sender’s identity ID0s , whose
private key SKs0 has never been queried. F wins if the Designcryption do not return a ⊥.
Definition 5: An algorithm is EUF-CMA secure, if there is
no PPT adversary which can win Game 3 with non-negligible
advantage.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME

This section illustrates our signcryption scheme in detail.
The proposed scheme involves four participants: KGC,
PKG, sender IDs , and n authorized receivers with identities
ID1 , ID2 , . . . , IDn . The four algorithms described as follow:
A. SETUP ALGORITHM

With a security parameter λ as input, system randomly selects
a prime p (q ≥ pk , k is a long integer.), and generates an
ecliptic curve E defined on finite filed Fp . Then, chooses
an additive group G on E and its generator P with order p.
Because of the heterogeneity of SM-IoT environment, we use
the PKG and the KGC to generate keys for users in different
cryptography systems respectively.
1) PKG SETUP

Randomly chooses an integer s1 ∈Zp∗ where s1 is the master
key that only PKG knows, and one hash function: H0 :
{0, 1}∗ × G × G → Zp∗ . Then, computes P1 = s1 P, and
P1 is the public key of PKG.
2) KGC SETUP

Randomly chooses an integer s2 ∈Zp∗ as the master key, and
computes P2 = s2 P as KGC’s public key. Then, defines five
hash functions as follow:
H1 : {0, 1}∗ × G × G → Zp∗ ,
H2 : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ × G × G → Zp∗ ,
H3 : Zp∗ → {0, 1}∗ ,
H4 : Zp∗ × G → {0, 1}∗ ,
H5 : {0, 1}∗ × G × G × {0, 1}∗ × Zp∗ × Zp∗ × ... × Zp∗
→ Zp∗ .
Chooses symmetric encryption/decryption function as
Encρ /Decρ . ρ is a symmetric key.
VOLUME 7, 2019
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Then, publishes the system’s public parameter param =
E, G, p, P, P1 , P2 , H0 , H1 , H2 , H3 , H4 , H5 , Encρ , Decρ ,
and keep master keys s1 , s2 secret respectively.
B. KEY EXTRACTION ALGORITHM

This algorithm is divided into IBC-KG Algorithm and
CLC-KG Algorithm for the sender and the receivers
respectively.
1) IBC-KG ALGORITHM

Sender transmits his IDs to PKG. PKG randomly selects
an integer ts ∈Zp∗ , computes Ts = ts P, and ds = ts +
s1 hs (mod p), where hs = H0 (I Ds , Ts , P1 ). Finally, returns
SKs = (Ts , ds ) back via secure channel.

5) Computes h = H5 (I Ds , R1 , R2 , C, θ, a0 , . . . , an−1 ),
ρ = H3 (θ) and S = Enc(ρ) (C).
6) Computes ν = (hr2 + ds )−1 r1 (modp).
Finally, the sender sets σ = (S, R2 , ν, h, A) as signcryption
ciphertext and broadcasts it to the SM-IoT receivers of CLC
system through communication channel.
D. DESIGNCRYPTION ALGORITHM

Given σ = (S, R2 , ν, h, A), and receiver’s private key,
Designcryption Algorithm runs as follow:
First, the gateway obtain the sender’s key Ts and performs
as follow.
1) Computes
R01 = ν(hR2 + Ts + hs P1 )

2) CLC-KG ALGORITHM

Receivers of CLC system obtain their partial private keys,
generate their full private keys and public keys as follow:
Set Secret Value Algorithm: Receiver Ri with identity IDi
randomly selects an integer xi ∈Zp∗ , and computes Xi = xi P,
then sends (IDi , Xi ) to the KGC.
Set Partial Private Key Algorithm: Upon receiving IDi and
Xi , KGC randomly chooses an integer ti ∈Zp∗ , compute Ti =
ti P, and di = ti + s2 hi (mod p), where hi = H1 (I Di , Ti , P2 ).
Then, compute ui = di + H1 (IDi , s2 Xi , Ti ), KGC transmits Ti
and ui through public channel.
Set Public Key Algorithm: Upon receiving Ti and ui from
KGC, the receiver checks the equation:
ui P = Ti + hi P2 + H1 (IDi , xi P2 , Ti )P

(5)

if the equation holds, the receiver accepts Ti and ui , and sets
PKi = h−1
i (Ti + Xi ) as his public key, and sends PKi to KGC
for publication. Otherwise, the receiver rejects Ti and ui .
Set Full Private Key Algorithm: The receiver of the
SM-IoT environment obtain
di = ui − H1 (IDi , xi P2 , Ti )

(6)

(8)

where hs = H0 (I Ds , Ts , P1 ).
2) Constructs the ciphertext σ1 = (σ, R01 ) and sends it to
receivers.
Designcryption: This algorithm runs by SM-IoT receivers
of CLC system, with ciphertext σ1 as input.
1) Compute Ui0 = R01 (xi + di ), and γi0 = H2 (IDs , IDi ,
Ui0 , R01 ).
2) Substitute γi0 into f (x), and figure out f (γi0 ) = x n +
an−1 x n−1 + ... + a1 x + a0 = θ 0 , and calculate ρ 0 =
H3 (θ 0 ).
3) Decrypt C 0 = Dec(ρ 0 ) (S), and obtain h0 =
H5 (I Ds , R01 , R2 , C 0 , θ 0 , a0 , . . . , an−1 ). Then, checks if
h0 = h. If yes, continue to decrypt. Otherwise, output
false symbol ⊥ and aborts.
4) Computes αi = H4 (γi0 , R01 ), and then searches corresponding H4 (γi , R1 )||ci in C through αi .
5) If there is no equation satisfies that αi = H4 (γi , R1 )
during the search process, aborts and returns ⊥.
Otherwise, recovers message m0i = ci ⊕ H3 (γi0 ) and
accept it.

Then, sets SKi = (xi , di ) as his full private key.
V. CORRECTNESS PROOF AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. CORRECTNESS PROOFS

C. SIGNCRYPTION ALGORITHM

With the private key SKs of sender, the public parameter
param, the receiver’s identity IDi and public key PKi (i =
1, 2, . . . , n) as input, the sender in IBC system runs the
algorithm as follow:
1) Randomly chooses two integers r1 , r2 ∈Zp∗ , and computes R1 = r1 P, R2 = r2 P.
2) Computes Ui = r1 hi (PKi + P2 ) and γi =
H2 (I Ds , I Di , Ui , R1 ), for each receiver.
3) Computes ci = mi ⊕ H3 (γi ), and constructs C =
{H4 (γ1 , R1 )||c1 , γ2 , R1 )||c2 , . . . , H4 (γn , R1 )||cn }.
4) Randomly chooses θ ∈ Zp∗ . Then, computes
f (x) =

n
Y

(x − γi ) + θ(modp)

i=1
n

= x + an−1 x n−1 + ... + a1 x + a0
ai ∈

Zp∗ ,
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and sets A = {ai |i = 0, . . . , n − 1}.

(7)

This is the correctness proof of our scheme.
Theorem 1: The verification of SM-IoT receiver’s partial
private key in Key Extraction Algorithm is correct.
Proof: Eqn. (5) ui P = Ti + hi P2 + H1 (IDi , xi P2 , Ti )P
guarantees the correctness of the partial private key, because:
ui P = (ti + hi s2 + H1 (IDi , s2 Xi , Ti ))P
= ti P + hi s2 P + H1 (IDi , s2 xi P, Ti )P
= Ti + hi P2 + H1 (IDi , xi P2 , Ti )P
It can be seen from the above derivation process that the
equation ui P = Ti +hi P2 +H1 (IDi , xi P2 , Ti )P holds, so it can
be proved that our partial private key verification is correct.
Theorem 2: The computation of R01 in Designcryption
Algorithm is correct.
Proof: The derivation process of signature verification
is guaranteed by the equation h = h0 , and the correctness of
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J. Qiu et al.: Efficient Multi-Message and Multi-Receiver Signcryption Scheme for Heterogeneous SM-IoT

R01 is required. R01 is calculated as follow:
R01 = ν(hR2 + Ts + hs P1 )
= (hr2 + ds )−1 r1 (hR2 + Ts + hs P1 )
= r1 (hr2 + ts + s1 hs )−1 (hr2 + ts + hs s1 )P
= r1 P
= R1
R01 can be verified in Theorem 4.
Theorem 3: Ui0 = R01 (xi + di ) is equal to Ui = r1 hi (PKi +
P2 ), i.e., Ui0 = Ui .
Proof:
Ui0 = R01 (xi + di ) = r1 P(xi + di )

1) Setup: Challenger C sets P2 = aP, and provides public
parameter to adversary AI . AI chooses target identities I =
{IDi |i = 1, 2, . . . , n}.
2) Phase 1: C keeps lists LHi of Hi (i = 0, 1, . . . , 5), and
LPK of keys.
a) Hi (i = 0, 1, . . . , 5) query (qHi ): After receiving the
Hi query, C checks if the corresponding tuple exists in
the list LHi . If yes, challenger C retrieves and returns
it to adversary AI . Otherwise, challenger C randomly
chooses an integer as result, returns to AI , and stores in
list LHi .
b) Key-query: If the tuple IDj , xj , dj , PKj exists in the
LPK , gets the tuple. Otherwise:
•

= r1 (xi P + ti P + hi s2 P)
= r1 (Xi + Ti + hi P2 )

•

= r1 hi (h−1
i (Xi + Ti ) + P2 )
= r1 hi (PKi + P2 ) = Ui
Theorem 4: The verification of h = h0 is correct by
authorized receiver.
Proof: Receivers get the correct R01 , Ui0 proved in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, and then get γi0 = γi , and only
the designated receivers can obtain correct ρ 0 = ρ. Then,
the receiver uses ρ 0 to decrypt S to get correct C 0 , and
computes h0 = H5 (I Ds , R01 , R2 , C 0 , θ 0 , a0 , . . . , an−1 ). It is
obvious that the equation h = h0 holds, since R01 = R1 and
C 0 = C.

c)

d)

e)
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS

We analyze the security of this efficient signcryption scheme
based on the security model defined in Section 3. The message confidentiality depends on the establishment of Theorem 5 and Theorem 6, which follow Game 1 and Game 2
defined in Subsection D of Section 3 respectively. The
unforgeability depends on the establishment of the Theorem 7
which follows Game 3.
1) CONFIDENTIALITY

Theorem 5: The proposed scheme is IND-CCA2-I secure
under the random oracle model, with the assumption that the
CDHP is difficult.
Lemma 1: In the random oracle, if there is an adversary AI
wins the Game 1 with non-negligible advantage ε, the CDHP
can be solved by the challenger C, with non-negligible advanqs (nqs +qH2 )
tage ε 0 ≥ (1 −
)(1 − q2dk ) within τ 0 ≤ τ + O(nqs +
2k
qpk + qd )τpm , where τpm denotes the time to calculate a scalar
point multiplication on ECC. The adversary AI can make at
least qHi times of Hi query, qs times of signcryption query,
qd times of designcryption query, qsv times of secret value
query, qppk times of partial private key query, and qpk times
of public key query.
Proof: Assume that the adversary AI attacks
IND-CCA2-I security of the proposed scheme. With a tuple
hP, aP, bPi, C interacts with AI and hopes to solve CDHP.
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f)
g)

h)

If IDj ∈ I , randomly chooses integer xj ∈ Zp∗ , sets
dj = ⊥, returns SKj = (xj , ⊥).
If IDj ∈
/ I , randomly chooses integers xj , tj , hj ∈
Zp∗ , sets dj = tj + ahj modp.

Then, sets PKj = h−1
j (Xj + Tj ), where Xj = xj P, Tj =
tj P, updates hj to LH1 .
Partial private key query (qppk ): With input IDj ,
if IDj ∈ I , C aborts. Otherwise, if IDj exists in LPK ,
returns dj ; if not, performs Key-query and returns dj .
Secret value query (qsv ): If the input IDj ∈ I , C returns
⊥ and aborts. Otherwise, if exists in LPK , C returns
SKj = (xj , dj ); if not, C performs Key-query and returns
SKj . If the public key of IDj has been replaced, sets
dj = ⊥.
Public key query (qpk ): Challenger C checks if the tuple
of IDj exists in LPK . If yes, returns PKj to the adversary
AI . Otherwise, performs Key-query, then returns PKj
and updates the key list LPK .
Replace public key Replaces the public key of IDj with
PKj 0 , and sets dj = ⊥.
Signcryption query (qs ): The adversary AI performs a
signcryption query with IDs , IDj , and message M as
inputs. Challenger C runs Signcryption Algorithm only
if IDj ∈
/ I.
Designcryption query (qd ): AI sends designcryption
query with IDs ,IDj , and ciphertext σ = (S, R2 , ν, h, A)
as inputs. Challenger C checks if IDj ∈ I . If yes, C
aborts; otherwise, C runs the Designcryption Algorithm
and returns the result.

3) Challenge: AI submits two plaintexts M0 ,M1 (Mβ =
β
{mi |i = 1, . . . , n}) with equal length, and IDs , IDi (i =
1, . . . , n) to the challenger C. C aborts if IDi ∈
/ I . Otherwise,
C chooses a bit β ∈ {0, 1}, and computes R1 = bP,
Ui = bhi (PKi + P2 ), randomly chooses γi∗ , r2∗ , ν ∗ , θ ∗ ∈ Zp∗ .
Then, computes R∗2 = r2∗ P, and generates the ciphertext as
β
Cβ = {H4 (γi∗ , R1 )||mi ⊕H3 (γi∗ )|i = 1, . . . , n}. List equation
n
Q
f (x) =
(x − γi∗ ) + θ ∗ (modp) to calculate A = {ai |i =
i=1

0, . . . , n − 1}. Computes ρ ∗ = H3 (θ ∗ ), and Sβ = Encρ ∗ (Cβ ),
h∗ = H5 (IDs , R1 , R∗2 , Cβ , θ ∗ , a0 , . . . , an−1 ). Finally, challenger C returns a ciphertext σ ∗ = (Sβ , R∗2 , ν ∗ , h∗ , A).
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4) Phase 2: AI performs a series of query as in Phase 1,
except the query for the private key of target identities whose
public key has been replaced, the partial private key of target
identities, or the designcryption query for σ ∗ .
5) Guess: The adversary AI outputs a bit β 0 according to
the phases performed above. If β 0 = β, then AI wins this
game, and the challenger outputs abP = Ui h−1
i − R1 as the
solution to CDHP. Otherwise, C aborts and outputs ⊥.
From the discussion above, the conclusion that the advantage of the challenger C sovling the CDHP is analyzed as
follow. The probability of adversary AI failing in signcryption
qs (nqs +qH2 )
, and the probability of C rejecting a
query is
2k
valid ciphertext during designcryption query is q2dk . Therefore,
the total advantage of challenger C to solve CDHP is ε 0 ≥
qs (nqs +qH2 )
(1−
)(1− q2dk ), within τ 0 ≤ τ +O(nqs +qpk +qd )τpm .
2k
Theorem 6: The proposed scheme is IND-CCA2-II secure
with the assumption that the CDHP is difficult.
Lemma 2: If the adversary AII wins the Game 2 with nonnegligible advantage ε, (AII can query at most qsv times of
secret value, qppk times of partial private key, qHi times of Hi
query, qs times of signcryption query, and qd times of designcryption query), the CDHP can be solved by the simulator C,
qH qd
with non-negligible advantage ε 0 ≥ ε − 22k .
Proof: Assume that the adversary AII attacks
IND-CCA2-II security of the scheme.
1)Setup: Challenger C sets P2 = s2 P, sends system public
parameter to AII . Adversary AII chooses target identities I =
{IDi |i = 1, 2, . . . , n}.
2) Phase 1: Challenger C keeps the lists LHi of Hi query
results and LPK of key query results. AII makes polynomial
bounded number of query as follow.
a) Hi (i = 0, 1, . . . , 5) query (qHi ): Challenger C
responds as in Phase 1 of Game 1.
b) Key query: With IDj as input, C checks if exists in LPK .
If yes, C retrieves the result. Otherwise:
•
•

If IDj ∈ I , sets xj = ⊥.
If IDj ∈
/ I , randomly chooses tj , hj ∈ Zp∗ , sets
xj = a.

Then, sets SKj = (xj , dj ), computes dj = tj + s2 hj mod
p, PKj = hj −1 (Tj + Xj ), where Tj = tj P, Xj = xj P.
c) Public key query (qpk ): Upon receiving IDj , challenger
C checks if the corresponding tuple exists in LPK , and
retrieves public key and returns back if yes. Otherwise
C makes a key query to obtain the corresponding public
key.
d) Secret value query (qsv ): Upon receiving IDj , challenger C checks if IDj ∈ I . If yes, then returns ⊥ and
aborts. If not, C retrieves the result xj from LPK , or performs key query to obtain xj , and then returns it to the
adversary AII .
e) Partial private key query (qppk ): If the tuple of IDj
exists in list LPK , challengerC retrieves the corresponding partial private key from LPK . Otherwise, c performs
key query to get the answer.
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f) Signcryption query (qs ): With IDs , IDj (IDj ∈
/ I ), and
message M as inputs, challenger C runs Signcryption Algorithm to generate corresponding signcryption
ciphertext σ .
g) Designcryption query (qd ): Adversary AII performs
the designcryption query with IDs , IDj (IDj ∈
/ I ), and
cipher-text σ as inputs. The challenger C runs the
Designcryption Algorithm to obtain the plaintext, and
then returns the result.
3) Challenge: The adversary AII submits two plaintexts
β
M0 , M1 (Mβ = {mi |i = 1, . . . , n}) with equal length, and
IDs , IDi to C. The challenger C aborts if IDi ∈
/ I . Otherwise, C
chooses a bit β ∈ {0, 1}, computes R1 = bTi , Ui = b(Xi +Ti ),
chooses γi∗ , r2∗ , ν ∗ , θ ∗ ∈ Zp∗ , and computes R∗2 = r2∗ P, h∗ and
A = {ai |i = 0, . . . , n − 1}. Then, challenger generates the
ciphertext as Cβ , ρ ∗ = H3 (θ ∗ ), and Sβ = Encρ ∗ (Cβ ). Finally,
C returns a signcryption ciphertext σ ∗ = (Sβ , R∗2 , ν ∗ , h∗ , A).
4) Phase 2: The adversary AII performs queries as in
Phase 1, except secret key query of any target identity,
private key query of receivers whose public key has been
replaced and the designcryption query of target signcryption
ciphertext σ ∗ .
5) Guess: AII outputs a bit β 0 according to the phases
performed above. If β 0 = β, then AII wins the game, and the
challenger outputs abP = Ui − R1 as the solution to CDHP.
Otherwise, challenger C outputs ⊥ and aborts.
Through the interaction with AII , the probability advantage
of challenger C breaking CDHP within τ 0 ≤ τ +O(nqs +qpk +
qs (nqs +qH2 )
)(1 − q2dk ).
qd )τpm is ε 0 ≥ ε(1 −
2k
2) UNFORGEABILITY

Theorem 7: The proposed scheme is EUF-CMA secure with
the assumption that the ECDLP is difficult.
Lemma 3: If the forger F wins the Game 3 with nonnegligible advantage ε, the ECDLP can be solved by the
challenger C, with non-negligible advantage ε 0 .
Proof: C looks forward to solving this answer through
the interaction with forger F.
1) Setup: C runs the algorithm to generate system public
parameter, sets P1 = s1 P and sends param and KGC’s master
key s2 to F. F chooses a target identity ID0s .
2) Attack: Forger F performs a series of queries as follow.
a) Hi query (qHi ): Upon receiving the query on identity
IDs , C checks if the corresponding tuple result exists in
LHi . If yes, returns the result. If not, randomly chooses
an integer, then returns it back to the forgery, and stores
in the list LHi .
b) Private key query (qsk ): The forger F submits IDs to
C. Then, challenger C checks if IDs = ID0s . If yes, C
returns ⊥ and aborts. Otherwise:
•
•

If IDs corresponding tuple exists in LSK , then
retrieve and returns the result.
If not, C sets SKs = ts + s1 hs , Ts = ts P, where
ts ∈ Zp∗ . Then returns back, and stores the tuple.
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TABLE 2. Comparison of functions.

c) Signcryption query (qs ): The forger F submits a signcryption query with IDs ,IDi , and n messages mi , i =
1, 2, . . . , n as inputs. If IDs 6 = ID0s , C runs the Signcryption Algorithm as normal, then returns the signcryption
ciphertext σ to F. Note that the hash values used in
Signcryption Algorithm are retrieved from corresponding LHi hash oracles.
3) Forgery: If F is an efficient forger, then by forking
lemma [60], F’ can forge two signcryption ciphertext σ 0 =
(S 0 , R02 , ν 0 , h0 , A0 ), σ ∗ = (S 0 , R∗2 , ν ∗ , h∗ , A∗ ). We can combine
the two equations, R01 = ν 0 (ds0 P+h0 R02 ), R∗1 = ν ∗ (ds0 P+h∗ R02 ).
(h∗ −h0 )r 0

Then, the algorithm outputs a = ν 0 −ν ∗ 2 .
Thus the ECDLP can be solved within time τ 0 ≤
120686qs τ/ε, and the advantage of F forges a signature in
time τ is ε ≥ 10(qs + 1)(qs + qH5 )/2k , the derivations is
similar to Barreto et al. [56].
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND
FUNCTIONAL COMPARISON

This section illustrates the advantages of the proposed scheme
through making a comparison of functions and computational
efficiency between the proposed scheme and the existing
ones [27], [39]– [52], [44]– [55], [58], [59], because these
schemes have similar functions as ours. We implement a
series of tests of [44], [50], [55], [58], as well as corresponding figure, which is intended to show the performance
comparison results more intuitively.
A. COMPARISON OF FUNCTIONS

We compare functions of our scheme and schemes [27],
[39]– [52], [44]– [55], [58], [59]. The results is shown
in Table 2. There are four schemes [51], [52], [55], [59]
consider the heterogeneity of SM-IoT. However, [51], [52],
[59] have the burden of certificate management, because they
are constructed based on PKI. Therefore, they are not suitable
for the SM-IoT. Reference [39] takes the public verifiability
into consideration, which shifts most computational cost of
designcrypt from the SM-IoT receiver to the gateway. But
this scheme not consider the heterogeneity, which limits its
application in the SM-IoT environment.
180214

Multi-receiver and multi-message scheme are satisfied
by schemes [44], [50], [55], [59], and there are four
schemes [45], [51], [52], [58] only meet multi-receiver function. However, as we can see, schemes [27], [39]– [52], [44],
[55], [59] are constructed based on bilinear pairing, which is
an expensive operation for the SM-IoT environment.
Through hiding the SM-IoT receiver’s partial private key
of CLC system during key generation phase, our scheme no
longer need wireless secure channel to transmit partial private
key. Therefore, our scheme is more suitable for wireless
SM-IoT environment.
Through the comparison and analysis above, it is obvious that compared with these schemes, our scheme meets
all the functions mentioned in Table 2, including heterogeneity, multi-message and multi-receiver, pairing free, and
no requirement for wireless secure channel. The proposed
scheme transmits part of computational overhead to the gateway through outsourcing, meets the heterogeneity feature of
the SM-IoT by constructing the scheme based on IBC and
CLC, and improves the efficiency of encryption and decryption by using scalar point multiplication on ECC instead
of bilinear pairing. Therefore, our scheme has higher efficiency, and is more practical for application in the SM-IoT
environment.
B. COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE

In this subsection, to have better understanding the Table 3,
we define notations to denote computational complexity of
different mathematical operations, and give the descriptions
of their definition in Table 2. In order to provide a numerical
result, we use C and Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC)
Library [61] to implement related mathematical operations.
The well-known super-singular elliptic curve type-A y2 =
x 3 + x is used to reach the same security level as 1024-bit
RSA, the curve group has 160-bit group order, 512-big
field size, and the embedding degree of the curve is 2. Our
implementation runs on a Personal Computer with intel(R)
Core(TM) i3-3220 CPU @ 3.3GHz, VMware 15.0.4, Linux
ubuntu 18.04 operating system with 3 GB of RAM. The
execution time is computed considering the average of ten
succeeding run with different inputs. Table 2 displays the
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TABLE 3. Notations and benchmark.

TABLE 4. Comparison of computational complexity.

FIGURE 2. The computational time of Signcryption Algorithm.

FIGURE 3. Receivers’ computational time of Decryption/Designcryption.

execution time of different mathematical operations used in
the schemes discussed. It is important to note that we only
consider expensive operations. We analysis the computational complexity of schemes [44], [50], [55], [58], and our
scheme. The comparison results are shown in Table 4.
For Signcryption Algorithm, e.g., Sun and Li [51] needs
n bilinear pairing operations, 2n point multiplications, and n
exponentiation after pairing, Islam et al. [45] requires (2n+1)
point multiplications and 2n additions on ECC, Niu et al. [55]
needs (n + 2) point multiplications, 2n bilinear pairing operations and 2n exponentiation after pairing, whereas our scheme
only needs (n+2) point multiplication and n addition on ECC,
which is lower than most schemes listed in TABLE 4, and is
about the same as the schemes [46], [50]. Nevertheless, for
Designcryption/decryption Algorithm, the SM-IoT receiver
in our scheme only requires one point multiplication on ECC,

which is lower than schemes [46], [50]. As can be seen
from the TABLE 4, the efficiency of our scheme is relatively
improved in both sender and receiver sides.
To show the results intuitively, we present the execution time of Signcryption Algorithm of schemes [44], [50],
[55], [58] in Fig. 2, and the execution time of Designcryption/decryption Algorithm at SM-IoT receiver side in Fig. 3,
which are based on the execution time implemented with
Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) Library. From the Fig. 2,
we can see that the signcryption computational time of
our scheme is the same as the scheme proposed by
Pang et al. [50], which is more efficient than other compared
schemes. The Fig. 3 shows that our scheme has the lowest
calculation time in the receiver side. In the light of Table 4,
Fig. 2, and Fig. 3, we can draw the conclusion that our scheme
has less calculation time in both sender and receiver sides.
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VII. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have proposed a signcryption scheme for
SM-IoT, to achieve secure and efficient multi-message and
multi-receiver communication from senders of IBC system
to receivers of CLC system. We hide the partial private
key during the key generation phase of the traditional CLC
system, which means SM-IoT receivers and the KGC no
longer need wireless secure channel to transmit their partial
private keys. The proposed scheme is constructed based on
ECC which has higher efficiency, and do not employ bilinear
pairing and exponentiation operations. Besides, our scheme
outsourced part of computational overhead to the gateway,
so as to minimize the computation costs of the SM-IoT
receivers. And the designated receivers can verify signature
and outsourced result securely. Therefore, on the whole, our
scheme has less computational complexity and higher efficiency compared with the schemes proposed before in both
sender side and receiver side. Therefore, it is more suitable for
the heterogeneous SM-IoT environment. For further research
in our work, we will consider aggregate signcryption schemes
between IBC and CLC, to achieve efficient mutual multicommunication in the heterogeneous SM-IoT.
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